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1 Background and Statement of problem 
 
“A buyer must not be able to place an order, thereby causing the seller 
to invest time and resources in filling that order, and then repudiate the 
order.” (Romney & Steinbart, 2003: 61) 
 
The risk of repudiation, as mentioned above, forms part of the three 
fundamental characteristics, namely “validity, integrity and privacy”, that 
must be present in any business transaction. This includes e-business 
processes. (Romney & Steinbart, 2003: 61)  
In B2B environments where customers are allowed to place orders on 
“open” accounts, the suppliers of the items are, among others, subjected 
to the particular risk of an unauthorised order being placed on the “open” 
account of an existing customer. This is possible in instances where a 
person illegitimately uses valid customer identification details (like user 
names and passwords), to place unauthorised orders. Another risk 
associated with the above, is the risk of unauthorised changes being 
made to a B2B order, after the initial approval and authorisation of the 
transaction.  
In instances where either of the above occurred the customer will, at 
subsequent delivery of the goods, either deny placing the order, or 
disagree with the content of the delivery. The customer will refuse to 
accept the goods and consequently deny the responsibility of payment 
for the items involved – the customer has repudiated the transaction. 
Repudiation causes monetary losses to the supplier who had, based on 




In this particular environment, specific internal control measures to verify 
the validity of a B2B order before being accepted and processed are 
necessary within the supplier’s system. It is essential that the supplier 
establishes and verifies the source of an order and links it to a specific 
customer. It must be ensured that a valid customer placed the order and 
that it can be accepted and processed by the supplier without the risk of 
subsequent repudiation. The supplier must also have procedures in 
place to ensure that no unauthorised changes are made to previously 
approved order transactions, resulting in orders being filled and 
delivered inaccurately. 
 
2 Purpose of study 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate existing control frameworks and 
internal control measures in an attempt to provide a framework of 
internal control measures that can be implemented by B2B suppliers to 
address the risk of repudiation when orders are placed on open 
accounts. 
If B2B suppliers implement the necessary controls it should lead to an 
improved system of internal control. It will decrease the occurrence of 
repudiation due to invalid orders that were accepted and processed, or 
processed whilst containing unauthorised changes. Less repudiation of 
transactions by customers should lead to the prevention or reduction of 
losses suffered by suppliers as a result thereof.  
Suppliers operating in this environment can use the framework provided 
in this report to perform an assessment of their own systems of internal 
control. It will enable them to identify any weaknesses in their existing 
system of internal control and where necessary, make adjustments for 
improvement by implementing the controls recommended in the 
framework.  
The framework can also assist auditors in their assessment of the 
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To arrive at this framework of internal control measures, internal control 
and the purpose of a system of internal control will be discussed in 
Chapter 2. The specific problems and risks addressed in this report are 
also illustrated.  
Chapter 3 provides a simplistic explanation of how a typical sales 
transaction transpires. Examples of the internal control measures that 
can be implemented to address the risk of repudiation within a manual 
system of internal control are mentioned. The sales process is then 
“translated” to a computer environment by describing how a typical sales 
transaction takes place when a computer is introduced. Typical internal 
control measures that can be implemented within a computerised 
system are briefly mentioned.  
The Internet, e-business and B2B transactions are defined in Chapter 4. 
E-business risk and the problems associated with repudiation and the 
prevention thereof, is discussed. The term “open” B2B account system is 
explained.  
Existing control frameworks and internal control measures available to 
address the risks associated with an e-commerce system are defined 
Chapter 5. These internal control measures are evaluated to determine 
which of these controls are relevant in a B2B environment to address the 
particular risks as defined. These internal control procedures are 
provided in Chapter 6.  
A framework of internal control measures that will address the risks and 
problems associated with repudiation will be provided by way of a matrix 
in Chapter 7. A summary of this report and the conclusions drawn are 




4 Limitations of study 
Although the basic principles and the definition of internal control are 
provided in this report, it will be accepted as stated for purposes of this 
study and will not be examined or questioned further. 
A typical purchase and payment cycle poses numerous business risks 
for both the buyer (customer) and the seller (supplier). This study will 
only address the repudiation-problem from the perspective of a B2B 
supplier, and only those related to orders for physical products. Although 
some of the concepts and risks may well be present in the environment 
that forms the topic of this report, Internet sales of digital and electronic 
products, like ShareWare, as well as the provision of services, fall 
outside the scope of this report.   
The study will further be limited to B2B open account systems. 
Traditional e-business sales transactions where the creditworthiness and 
payment for the goods are immediately, electronically verified by the 
supplier, does not form part of this study. In such instances the supplier 
is not subjected to the specific risk as defined in this report. These types 
of systems once again creates additional risks, like the provision of 
stolen credit card information, the hacking of credit card information 
while being sent over communication channels, etc., that are not 
addressed in this report. 
Lastly, although the purpose of this study is to provide a framework of 
internal control measures for these B2B suppliers, this report is not 
intended to be a document in which the technical issues regarding the 





RISKS AND INTERNAL CONTROL 
 
1 Business risks 
When any transaction takes place between two business partners, risks 
are created when rights and obligations change hands. The Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) defines a risk as “any process, 
activity or event that can negatively influence the successful, sustainable 
and ethical achievement of enterprise objectives” (CICA, 1998: 409). 
According to King Report on Corporate Governance, “Risks are 
uncertain future events that could influence the achievement of an 
organisation’s objectives. These include risks threatening strategic, 
operational, financial and compliance objectives”. Risks should not only 
be viewed from a negative perspective.“ According to Suzanne Labarge, 
the Chief Risk Officer of the Royal Bank of Canada, “risk in itself is not 
bad, what is bad is risk that is mismanaged, misunderstood, mis-priced 
on unintended” (Naidoo, 2002).   
A business risk is defined as “the likelihood that an organisation will not 
achieve its business goals or objectives” (Hunton, Bryant, Bagranoff, 
2004: 48).  
These enterprise or management objectives include aspects like: 
• The effectiveness and efficiency of operations, 
• Safeguarding the company’s assets, 
• Compliance with applicable laws, regulations and supervisory 
requirements, 
• Supporting business sustainability under normal, as well as 
adverse operating conditions, 
• Reliable reporting, and 
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• Behaving responsibly towards all stakeholders. (King Report, 2002 
and SAICA).  
A specific risk exists “as a result of a location or method of operation of a 
particular function” (CICA, 1998: 8). Examples of critical risks a company 
may have to face are those relating to reputation, ethics, e-business, 
health, safety, environmental risks, as well as financial risks (KPMG, 
2001). Risk varies according to the circumstances a company finds itself 
in. Both internal and external factors may contribute to the possibility of a 
risk occurring (Hunton, et al., 2004: 48). The risks a company is faced 
with are also influenced by the industry within which the company 
operates. New risks are introduced as companies change their business 
processes and models, like for example moving from a pure manual 
system to a system that is fully computerised.  
Due to the fact that risk may vary from industry to industry, as well as 
within each business cycle, one particular type of transaction, namely a 
sales transaction taking place between two business partners, was 
chosen as the topic for further study. 
When a sales transaction takes place the supplier (seller) incurs costs in 
the manufacturing, packaging and delivery of the goods, as soon as a 
sales order is approved and accepted. On delivery of the goods, the 
customer (buyer) is responsible for the monetary value or cost of the 
items delivered. 
Based on the above definitions, it follows that risks will be present in and 
also arise from this sales process. Examples of the more general risks 
that can arise during a typical sales transaction is that unauthorised 
orders are processed, that orders are never processed, that orders are 
not executed and delivered accurately, that although ordered, goods are 
never sent to or never reaches the customer, etc.  
 
2 The purpose of internal control 
To address the business risks that are present within any transaction 
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cycle, the necessary internal control measures, or a so-called system of 
internal control, should be implemented. Various institutions have, by 
applying different control models, developed control frameworks (like 
CoCo, COSO and Cadbury) that can be applied to design a sound 
system of internal control. According to COSO (Committee of 
Sponsoring Organisations) one of the two principles of its efforts was to 
provide a standard against which businesses and other entities can 
assess their control systems and determine how to improve them 
(Boynton, Johnson & Kell, 2002: 324).  
The COSO report (Internal Control – Integrated Framework, Committee 
of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission, 1992) 
defines internal control as “a process, effected by the entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives …” 
(Boynton, et al., 2002: 325). CICA defines internal control as “those 
elements of an organisation (including its resources, systems, 
processes, structures and tasks) that, taken together, support people in 
the achievement of the organisation’s objectives. Control is effective to 
the extent that it provides reasonable assurance that the organisation 
will achieve its objectives reliably” (CICA, 1998: 11).  
Two of the important deductions that can be made from the above 
definitions of internal control need mentioning. Firstly that, due to the 
inherent limitations of internal control, a system of internal control can be 
expected to provide only reasonable assurance, and not absolute 
assurance, that if implemented, business risks would not materialise. 
The second is that the primary responsibility for the implementation and 
maintenance of this system of internal control lies with the directors and 
management of a company, while other parties (like the internal and 
external auditors) may also contribute useful information to an 
organisation in effecting control. (Boynton, et al., 2002: 325-328).  
This primary responsibility of the directors relating to internal controls, 
are supported by the King Report on Corporate Governance in South 
Africa. According to King the directors of a company need to identify the 
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key risk areas and key performance indicators of a company as well as 
how those risks are to be managed. King states that the board must see 
to it that there are adequate internal controls in place and that the 
management information systems can cope with the strategic direction in 
which the company is headed. 
 
3 Risk management 
The extent of internal control measures necessary to address the risks 
present within business processes, are assessed as a result of a risk 
management process. The board is responsible for the total process of 
risk management, as well as forming its own opinion on the 
effectiveness of the process. Management is accountable to the board 
for designing, implementing and monitoring the process of risk 
management and integrating it into the day-to-day activities of the 
company (King Report, 2002).     
Risk assessment for a company is the process of: 
• Identification of risk,  
• Identification of its potential impact on the enterprise,  
• Identification of existing controls which mitigate the risk,  
• An evaluation of the adequacy of the existing controls, and  
• The acceptability of the residual risk. 
“Residual risk is the nett risk that remains after implementing controls to 
mitigate the impact of risk facing an enterprise.” (CICA, 1998: 9)  
According to Protiviti, an American company that provides exclusive 
services on the areas of risk consultation and internal audit, the business 
risk management process is a continuous process of: 
• Establishing risk management objectives, tolerances and limits for 
all of the enterprise’s significant risks,  
• Assessing risks within the context of established tolerances,  
Chapter 2 
 9
• Developing cost-effective risk management strategies and 
processes consistent with the overall goals and objectives,  
• Implementing risk management processes,  
• Monitoring and reporting upon the performance of risk 
management processes,  
• Improving risk management processes continuously, and  
• Ensuring adequate communication and information for decision 
making. (Protiviti, 2003)  
KPMG defined Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as a “structured and 
disciplined approach aligning strategy, processes, people, technology, 
and knowledge with the purpose of evaluating and managing the 
uncertainties the enterprise faces as it creates value”. ERM maintains 
that a defined number of failures can be tolerated if the cost of guarding 
against them is more expensive than the risk they pose.  
During this risk management process the probability that a risk will occur 
(“likelihood”), as well as its impact if it does occur (“magnitude”), are 
considered. As a result of this process some risks will require no action, 
while risks with a potentially high likelihood of occurrence as well as a 
material impact if it should occur, requires action of management to bring 
the risk within the acceptable range of risk, or to eliminate the risk 
altogether. This takes place based on the risk/benefit analysis of the 
effect of the action on the enterprise as a whole. (KPMG, 2001)   
“In most situations, some residual risk is desirable, as the cost of 
implementing additional controls to eliminate the residual risk will exceed 
the potential impact of the residual risk occurrence” (CICA, 1998: 9). The 
board must decide on the company’s appetite or tolerance for risk – 
those risks that it will take and those it will not take in the pursuit of its 
goals and objectives (King Report, 2002).  
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In terms of the King Report the board is responsible for ensuring that a 
systematic, documented assessment of the processes and outcomes 
surrounding key risks is undertaken at least annually. This risk 
assessment should address the company’s exposure to at least the 
following: 
• Physical and operational risks, 
• Human resource risks, 
• Technology risks, 
• Business continuity and disaster recovery, 
• Credit and market risks, and 













(Source: KPMG, 2001) 
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4 A system of internal control  
The board should make use of generally recognised risk management 
and internal control models and frameworks in order to maintain a sound 
system of risk management and internal control to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of organisational objectives. (King 
Report, 2002)  
The COSO report identifies five interrelated internal control structure 
components, namely:   
• Control environment, 
• Risk assessment, 
• Information and communication, 
• Control activities, and 
• Monitoring (Boynton, et al., 2002).  
These components of a sound system of internal control can be 






(Source: Arens & Loebbecke, 2000) 
Figure 2: Components of internal control 
 
It is important to note that the basic principles and the definition of 
internal control as presented and explained in this chapter will be 













RISK OF REPUDIATION AND SPECIFIC INTERNAL 
CONTROL MEASURES 
 
1 Risk of repudiation for supplier 
One of the major business risks that a sales transaction poses to the 
supplier is the risk of repudiation of the transaction by the customer. In 
the context of a sales transaction taking place between a supplier and a 
customer and taking standard dictionary definitions into account, 
repudiation comprise that a customer (at delivery of the goods) denies, 
refuses or renounces his/her commitment or obligation towards the 
supplier. As mentioned previously this causes financial losses to the 
supplier, who had invested resources, time and effort into fulfilling the 
order.  
Repudiation of an order by a customer may be the result of: 
• Unauthorised orders that were placed, unbeknown to the customer, 
while using his/her details, and/or  
• Discrepancies between what was originally ordered and what are 
being delivered. This might be the result of unintentional mistakes 
made by the supplier, or intentional unauthorised changes made to 
the order after it was initially approved and accepted by the two 
parties involved.    
In order to minimise the possibility of repudiation the supplier needs to 
verify that an order is authorised and valid (comes from whom it claims 
to come) before being accepted and executed. The supplier also needs 
to ensure that the details of the delivery agree with the order that was 
originally placed. Ensuring the validity of a transaction before being 
accepted, as well as ensuring no unauthorised changes between 
authorising and delivery of an order will therefore contribute to 
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minimising the risk of subsequent repudiation. 
This is also evident from an explanation of the three characteristics of 
any business transaction, as stated by Romney & Steinbart. According 
to Romney & Steinbart any business transaction has to contain three 
characteristics, namely validity, integrity and privacy. It is defined as 
follows: 
• Validity: Both parties to a transaction must be able to authenticate 
the identity of the other party to ensure that the transaction is valid 
and enforceable. A buyer must not be able to place an order, 
thereby causing the seller to invest time and resources in filling that 
order, and then repudiate the order. Conversely, a seller cannot be 
allowed to solicit orders and then renege on delivery. 
• Integrity: Both parties to a transaction must have confidence that 
the information exchanged is accurate and has not been altered 
during the transmission process. 
• Privacy: The privacy or confidentiality of business transactions and 
any information exchanged in those transactions must be 
maintained, if so desired by either party. (Romney & Steinbart, 
2003: 61)    
This risk of repudiation substantially increases in systems where goods 
are sold to customers on credit. The reason for this is that, in a credit 
system, payment for the items does not immediately take place on 
delivery of the items, but at some future stage, as agreed upon by the 
parties involved. In addition, the occurrence of unauthorised orders 
placed within a credit system might only be detected at a later stage, for 
example when the items are delivered to the customer, or when the 
customer receives an invoice or statement for payment.  
It should be clear from the above that to sufficiently address the 
repudiation-risk it is essential that the supplier, before an order is 
accepted, authorised, processed and delivered, confirm the two 
important aspects, namely: 
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• The validity of the transaction and the source from which it came, 
as well as  
• The integrity of the transaction - ensuring no unauthorised changes 
were made subsequent to the authorisation and acceptance of the 
order.  
This can be achieved by implementing appropriate internal control 
measures to sufficiently address the specific risks associated with 
repudiation (Chapter 2).  
 
2 Internal control measures within a manual system 
In traditional manual business processes, authorisation and approval, 
which are usually principally evidenced by means of signatures, play an 
important role in ensuring the validity of a transaction. Additional 
procedures “such as signatures across sealed envelopes and certified or 
hand delivery” ensure that the contents of a message have not been 
altered. (Romney & Steinbart, 2003: 61) 
The manual internal control measures that a supplier can implement to 
address the defined risk, usually involves that the customer signs the 
order as evidence of acknowledgement of placing the order and 
accepting the responsibilities arising from it. Where sales are made on 
credit, the creditworthiness of a customer will be checked before an 
order is accepted and processed. This ensures that a valid, signed 
“contract” exists between the customer and the supplier for the ordering 
of the items as specified in the order. Responsibility and authorisation of 
the order is thus determined and defined.  
Before goods are sent to a customer, it is first established that an 
approved order exists (authorisation and validity) and that the content of 
the goods to be delivered agrees with what was originally ordered 
(integrity of the transaction). In practice this is achieved by agreeing the 
physical goods with copies of the order (in both the warehouse and the 
dispatch department’s possession), as well as the delivery note. This 
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process will amongst other things, confirm both the validity and 
authorisation for the dispatch, as well as detect any unauthorised 
changes made to originally, approved orders.  
Upon delivery, the customer is required to sign a copy of the delivery 
note. This signed copy with which the customer acknowledges that the 
goods, as specified on the delivery note, were taken into possession is 
sent back to the supplier. Invoicing by the supplier can subsequently 
take place based on the original order (which was signed and approved 
by the customer) as well as the customer signed copy of the delivery 
note (evidence of receipt of the goods). With his/her signature, the 
customer indicates or acknowledges his/her responsibility or obligation 
towards the supplier.  
When the internal control measures referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs are implemented, it reduces the risk that a customer can 
deny either placing the order or receiving the goods. Thus, no 
uncertainty exists regarding pinning responsibility for the monetary value 
of the items ordered and received on the customer.   
 
3 Risks within an electronic environment 
The principles of risks and internal control measures within a manual 
system as referred to in the preceding chapter are still applicable when 
the supplier operates within a computerised environment. The specific 
risks surrounding repudiation as defined earlier, still exists within an 
electronic environment. Romney and Steinbart states that the three 
fundamental characteristics of business transactions discussed 
previously, namely “validity, integrity and privacy”, are particularly true of 
e-business transactions (Romney & Steinbart, 2003: 61).  
Although the utilisation of computerised systems hold many advantages 
for the parties involved, the use of new technology also (besides the 
various existing risks) introduces “new” and in some instance, even 
greater, business risks (Moscove, 2001 and Hunton, 2004: 2) that needs 
to be addressed by the parties involved. It was mentioned in Section 1 of 
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Chapter 2 that “new” risks originate as business processes and models 
change – which is the case when moving from a manual to a 
computerised system. Note that some of the “new” risks in a computer 
environment might be similar to problems experienced within a manual 
system, but are “new” as they have to be addressed in a different way.  
Examples of these “new” risks that might be present in a computerised 
environment are using programs that contain programming errors, 
making mistakes during the input process, unauthorised access and 
changes to information, etc. It is important to note that although these, 
as well as numerous other risks are present within a computer 
environment, only the problems as defined earlier will be addressed in 
this report.  
 
4 Importance of IT-governance 
The Information Systems and Audit Control Association (ISACA) is of the 
opinion that when a computer is involved, it is critically important to the 
survival and success of an organisation to effectively manage 
information and related Information Technology (IT). IT Governance is 
defined by ISACA as “a structure of relationships and processes to direct 
and control the enterprise in order to achieve the enterprise’s goals by 
adding value while balancing risk versus return over IT and its 
processes”. (COBIT, 2000: 5) 
The objectives of IT Governance are “to set strategies for IT so that it is 
closely aligned with organisational goals and use IT for the maximum 
opportunity but minimum risk”. IT Governance is therefore divided into 
two parts: 
• The use of IT to promote an organisation’s objectives and to enable 
business processes, and 
• Managing and controlling IT-related risks (Hunton, et al., 2004: 2). 
It is thus clear that a supplier operating within a computer environment 
has to effectively manage and control their IT activities. This means that 
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they have to implement the necessary control measures in order to 
sufficiently address the risks they are facing. 
 
5 Internal control measures within the computer environment 
In section 2 of this chapter, the internal control measures that will assist 
in addressing the repudiation risk within a manual system were 
illustrated. As the environment in which a business operates and/or the 
technology utilised in the business process change, so the internal 
control measures have to be adapted in order to still effectively address 
risk (both the existing as well as the new risks created by the change). 
The control measures necessary to address the repudiation-risk within a 
computer environment will greatly depend on the level of 
computerisation of the supplier’s system. In systems were the computer 
is only used on a small scale some form of manual- and/or user controls 
might be sufficient, whilst applicable computerised internal measures 
might be essential in more complex computer systems.   
Except in systems where no hard copy order exists (real-time systems), 
it is general business practice that the customer still signs the order 
(produced by the computer system), as a means of acknowledgement 
and pinning responsibility. Certain supplier’s credit sales systems can 
even verify the debtor’s account number, as well as the available credit 
of a customer automatically against the debtors’ master file, before a 
credit order for goods is accepted and processed. This means that the 
customer’s signature may still remain the main source of authorisation 
and ensuring the validity of an order. Alternatively, electronic verification 
as illustrated above can be used.  
In a computerised system, the goods are still (as in a manual system) 
compared to the details of the copies of the order (which might only exist 
in an electronic format) before delivery takes place. Alternatively, the 
details of the goods dispatched are entered into the supplier’s computer 
system, where it is automatically matched with the details of the order 
received. With this process authorisation for the goods to leave the 
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premises and the delivery to take place is established. Possible 
unauthorised changes made to orders will also be detected.  
As in manual systems, customers are still required to sign and return 
signed delivery notes to the supplier. The details of the order, items 
dispatched and accepted by the customer can subsequently be entered 
onto the system of the supplier to be matched before invoicing takes 
place. Once again, the signature is acknowledgement of receiving the 
goods.  
Due to the fact that in such systems, invoicing only takes place based on 
the matched details of the underlying documents (which links the 
responsibility for the transaction to a specific customer by way of a 
signature), the chances of the customer repudiating the transaction and 





THE INTERNET, E-BUSINESS, E-COMMERCE AND B2B 
OPEN ACCOUNT SYSTEMS 
 
1 The Internet, e-business and e-commerce 
A major development in the information systems domain during the early 
1980’s, was the emergence of the Internet. The Internet consists of a 
worldwide system of computer networks through which computer users 
can communicate and transfer information using a universal protocol, 
called TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). (Weber, 
1999: 989).  
As computer technology evolved it became possible to conduct business 
transactions via the Internet - goods could be sold and bought over the 
Internet. The term e-business refers to all uses of advances in 
information technology with a view to improve the ways in which an 
organisation performs its business processes (Romney & Steinbart, 
2003: 49).  
E-business can be used for the following main types of activities:  
• Advertising products to potential on-line shoppers by displaying 
product catalogues on websites, 
• Electronic data interchange (EDI), where business information is 
shared and transferred between parties, in a data format 
understood by the parties involved, 
• Electronic fund transfers (EFT), where funds are transferred from 
one person or entity’s account to another in a paperless 
environment, by for example using Internet banking services, 
• Business to consumer (B2C) transactions, where business 
transactions takes place via the Internet directly between the 
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consumers and suppliers, for example Amazon.com who sells 
books to on-line Internet users, and 
• Business to business (B2B) transactions, where goods, services 
and/or information is shared between two business partners.  
Weber defines electronic commerce (e-commerce) as “the use of 
technology to enhance the processes of commercial transactions among 
a company and its customer and business partners” (Weber, 1999: 991). 
This means that e-commerce is a narrower concept than e-business that 
refers only to the electronic execution of business transactions such as 
buying and selling via the Internet (Romney & Steinbart, 2003: 49).    
Some industries are becoming increasingly dependent on technology for 
their survival, basically forcing them to change their business processes 
to include conducting business via the Internet. As a result of this and 
due to the various advantages it brings, e-commerce over the Internet is 
still increasing. Vendors, business partners as well as on-line retail 
shoppers find greater selection, convenience and lower prices on the 
Internet. By selling products over the Internet the potential customer 
base of a company is expanded substantially to millions of potential 
customers worldwide, which can be reached 24 hours of the day. It can 
lead to better satisfaction of the customer’s individual needs and can 
even bring about cost savings for the companies involved.   
According to reviews (Wagner, 2000) it was estimated that about 200 
million people worldwide were connected to the Internet in 2000. They 
were, at that stage, joined by seven new Internet users every second. 
Wagner predicted that by 2005 the Internet users were expected to have 
multiplied to one billion – one-seventh of the world’s population. 
(Wagner, 2000) 
According to a study conducted by eMarketer in April 2000, almost 34 
million US households were actively using the Internet, and of that 
number 23,5 million or 69% have made an Internet purchase. At that 
stage ActivMedia Research estimated that e-commerce activity for 2000 
would amount to $132 billion worldwide. (AICPA, 2001)  
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Closer to home, the “Electronic Communications and Transactions Bill” 
as approved by the South African Parliament, came into effect on 1 
March 2002. One of the aims of this Bill was “to provide for the 
facilitation and regulation of electronic communications and transactions 
…” The Bill is the first to acknowledge and give documents signed with 
electronic signatures the same legal status as signed paper documents 
in South Africa, thereby lending legitimacy to the e-commerce trade in 
South Africa.    
 
2 Business to business (B2B) commerce 
The concept of business partners conducting business among one 
another via the Internet (B2B-commerce) took the business world by 
storm in 1999 (Ward, 2003). Various companies integrate to form one, 
big, meta-company. Companies link their software, systems are 
integrated, and transactions and information is transferred between the 
companies concerned. With B2B the emphasis is on participation, the 
sharing of information and integration. 
A further development on the B2B scene was the creation of exchanges 
by groups of related companies for the purpose of conducting 
transactions mutually and sharing information between the parties 
involved. The purpose of these exchanges is “… to create liquidity in 
fragmented markets, by matching bids and offers and by acting as 
neutral enforcers of the rules” (Williams, Dale, Visser & Van der Wiele, 
2001) as well as to share information in a more collaborative way (Ward, 
2003). Exostar is an example of such an exchange that was created by 
large players in the aerospace and defence industry (Ward, 2003). 
The advantages of B2B commerce include the rapid availability of 
information, reductions in inventory levels, shorter manufacturing cycles 
and reduction in costs. Steve Butler, a senior analyst at eMarketer, 
alleges that the top players in the B2B industry are savings between 
20% and 30% on their online transactions compared with traditional 
methods of conducting business (Ward, 2003).  
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The first major development is this area started when major firms such 
as Walmart and General Electric moved buying and selling online to cut 
costs and speed up supplies. General Electric reported (The Economist, 
4 March 2000: 85-86) that due to this initiative procurement cycles was 
cut in half, processing costs by one-third and the cost of goods 
purchased by between 5% and 50%. In 1999 IBM had included 6,700 
suppliers into its online procurement system and bought more than $12 
billion worth of goods over the Internet, thereby eliminating around 5 
million invoices. This, together with sharper purchasing as a result of 
increased transparency, etc., resulted in IBM saving $240 million on the 
$11 billion it spend. (Williams, et al., 2001) 
Both Ford en General Motors reported in November 1999 that they were 
creating online automotive trade exchanges. At this stage, Ford, through 
a site called AutoXchange, planned to conduct $80 billion in transactions 
annually. By connecting to its 30,000 production suppliers it forecasted 
that through B2B transactions costs of conducting business could be cut 
by between 10% and 20% for the participating parties. Accordingly, 
General Motors, through a similar site, TradeXchange, believed that the 
cost of each purchase order would be slashed from $100 to $10. 
(Wagner, 2000) 
General Motors, Ford and Daimler Chrysler merged their individual 
exchanges in 2000 to create Covisint, a virtual market place for the 
automotive industry. According to a study by Goldman Sachs (Financial 
Times, 14 June 2000), the result would be a cost saving averaging just 
over $1000 per vehicle. (Williams, et al., 2001)  
The Economist (26 February 2000) reported that in 1999 global e-
commerce was worth little over $150 billion, with around 80% of these 
transactions taking place between one business and another (B2B) 
(Williams, et al., 2001). The popularity of B2B e-commerce is growing at 
a steady pace (Sairamesh, Mohan, Kumar, Hasson & Bender, 2002). 
Research in a study named “Real Numbers E-Commerce Study Series”, 
the result of which was published by ActivMedia Research in 2000, 
found that the extent of B2B purchasing was increasing and that the 
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volume of transaction would probably double over the next two years 
(that is until 2002). The study further found that 50% of all businesses 
then (in 2000) purchased online (Bartlett, 2000). Forrester reported (2 
June 2000: 156) that 79 percent of large companies is expected to be 
trading online by 2002 (Williams, et al., 2001). 
In a study performed by The Business Software Alliance (BSA), chief 
executive officers of various of the world’s top technology companies 
indicated that a big future awaits B2B e-commerce and they predicted 
that by 2010 B2B e-commerce will be the most significant form of 
business transaction in terms of dollar value (Bartlett, 2001).  
B2B commerce has created a global digital economy involving very 
substantial amounts of money. The value of B2B online transactions 
conducted has been escalating since first introduced in 1999 and is 
estimated to increase steadily, as illustrated below.  





















(Sources: Sairamesh, et al., 2002, 
Gartner Group, Williams, et al., 2001 & 
Techtarget, 2003) 
Figure 3: Statistics to illustrate significance of B2B commerce 
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3 E-business risk  
All of the concerns and objectives (which were applicable to normal 
business transactions) still apply to e-business transactions. It was 
previously mentioned that technology changes brought with it numerous 
opportunities and benefits, but also subjected businesses to new and in 
some instance, even greater, business risks (Moscove, 2001). As 
discussed earlier, risk changes as business models and processes 
change and IT-governance becomes essential, especially in the new e-
commerce environment.  
As B2B transactions can easily amount to thousands, millions and even 
trillions of dollars (as indicated earlier), sound security and governance is 
essential (Williams, 2001). The reason for this is that “failure … can 
prove massively expensive - financial repercussions can be 
astronomical, legal entanglements limitless and the effect on business 
partners incalculable” (Williams, 2001). An effective business strategy, 
which also addresses information technology, has to be developed and 
implemented (Moscove, 2001). E-business risk management, where e-
business risk is identified and appropriately addressed by implementing 
the necessary internal control measures, is essential.  
According to Moscove e-business risk can be classified into four 
categories, namely: 
• Information technology infrastructure,  
• User identification and authentication, 
• User privacy, and  
• Destructive computer programs.  
The Internet has changed the way in which two parties interact with one 
another. Firstly, the parties involved in an Internet transaction might not 
know each other prior to the transaction. The parties might know little or 
nothing about each other’s true identity, address, creditworthiness, 
reliability, etc.  
As a result, when e-commerce transactions take place via public 
Chapter 4 
 25 
networks like the Internet, three fundamental problems arise (Weber, 
1999: 991), namely: 
• “How do the parties to a transaction establish each other’s identity 
and authenticity? 
• How do the parties to a transaction protect the privacy of their 
dealings? 
• How do the parties to a transaction effect a secure exchange of 
money for any goods and services provided?”  
The abovementioned is also supported by the three fundamental 
characteristics of e-business transactions - validity, integrity, and privacy, 
discussed earlier.  
It is thus clear that the identification and confirmation (authentication) of 
a potential customer, as well as ensuring the integrity of a transaction 
(no unauthorised changes), is essential for all e-commerce transactions, 
as it is for any business transaction taking place manually or using 
computer technology. An important reason for this is to ensure that the 
transaction cannot subsequently by repudiated by the customer.  
 
4 Non-repudiation in a digital environment 
While all of the concerns and objectives present within a manual system, 
still apply to e-business transactions, the “methods used to satisfy them” 
(that is the internal control measures that can be implemented), do 
however change as technology evolves. (Romney & Steinbart, 2003: 
61). This means that the risk of repudiation still exists in a digital 
environment, but that the controls necessary will differ from those that 
were appropriate and sufficient in a manual environment.  
Non-repudiation within a digital environment requires that neither the 
sender not the receiver of a message be able to deny the transmission 
of a message (Stallings, 1995: 5). It means that “when a message is 
sent, the receiver can prove that the message was in fact sent by the 
alleged sender. Similarly, when a message is received, the sender can 
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prove that the message was in fact received by the alleged receiver” 
(Stallings, 1995: 11).  
Due to the fact that the supplier and the customer (or other business 
partner in case of B2B transactions) can geographically be separated 
from one another by thousands of kilometres when orders are placed via 
the Internet, the order can not physically be signed by the customer (as 
was the case in a manual system). This means that there is a lack of 
acknowledgement of placing the order, as well as a means in which to 
link the customer to the details of an order. No written ‘contract’, signed 
by the various parties as evidence of acknowledgment and accepting the 
conditions of the order, and the rights and obligations associated with it, 
is available. 
As a result of the above two important risks are created in a digital 
environment, namely the risks that: 
• Unauthorised orders, that was places by gaining authorised 
access, be accepted and processed, and 
• After initially accepting the order, unauthorised changes are made 
to the order, due to unauthorised access being gained to the order 
before/while being sent over the Internet communication channels.  
In an attempt to prevent repudiation in this environment it is necessary 
that an e-commerce order transaction (before being accepted and 
processed) be made legally binding and thus enforceable by the parties 
involved. To achieve this two important principles are necessary, 
namely: 
• User identification, and  
• User authentication. 
CICA defines these two principles as follows: 
• “User identification is the means by which users of information 
technology identify themselves when interacting with technology. 




• “User authentication is the means by which a user is confirmed as 
being the valid owner of the user identifier that the user presents to 
the system …“. (CICA, 1998: 219)  
In most systems user identification and authentication is performed when 
a user logs onto the system. Techniques that allow for continuous user 
authentication during a session, to confirm that the user who logged on 
at the commencement of the session continues to be the one using the 
system, are available. Due to the sensitive nature of certain transactions 
it may be necessary to use additional authentication techniques to 
authenticate the user at the time the specific transaction is processed. 
(CICA, 1998: 219-220)       
User identification and authentication generally involve the user 
presenting one, or a combination, of the following: 
• A measure, such as a user name, known to both the parties, with 
which the user identifies himself/herself,  
• Something only the user knows, such as a password, personal 
identification number (PIN) or a passphrase, 
• Something the user has (eg. a smart card, an electronic token or a 
physical key), 
• Something unique about the user based on biometrics (eg. a 
fingerprint, a hand measurement, a retina scan or a voice 
recognition measurement). (CICA, 1998: 220) 
It is clear that methods for both identification and authentication of a user 
are necessary before users can be allowed to enter into transactions. “It 
is increasingly common that, rather than relying on any one single 
technique, security systems are designed to use a combination of 
techniques for stronger user identification and authentication.” (CICA, 
1998: 220)   
The second requirement to address the risk of repudiation is that the 
processing integrity of the order transaction being sent over the Internet, 
be ensured by controlling access to the transaction and protect the 
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information sent over the communication channels from unauthorised 
access and/or changes. 
The general rule of evidence determines that if a person denies a 
particular signature (which in a manual system proved acknowledgement 
and acceptance of the transaction), the onus falls upon the relying party 
to prove that the signature is truly that of the person denying it. The term 
“deny” is synonymous to the term “repudiate”. This position is supported 
by standard dictionary definitions. In general terms, the term “non-
repudiation” crypto-technically means a service that “provides proof of 
the integrity and origin of data” (validity) in such a way that it could not 
be forged or subsequently be refuted. (McCullagh & Caelli, 2000)  
According to ISO/IEC 13888-1, -2 and –3 of the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), the purpose of non-repudiation in 
a digital environment is to deliver a services with a aim “to provide 
verifiable proof or evidence … of”:  (McCullagh & Caelli, 2000) 
• Approval: proof of whom is responsible for approval of the content 
of a message,  
• Sending: proof of who sent a message, 
• Origin: a combination of approval and sending services,  
• Submission: proof that a delivery authority has accepted a 
message for transmission,  
• Transport: proof to the originator of the message that a delivery 
authority has given the message to the intended recipient,  
• Receipt: proof that the recipient received the message,  
• Knowledge: proof that the recipient recognised the content of a 
received message, and  
• Delivery: a combination of receipt and knowledge services that 
provides proof that the recipient received and recognised the 
content of a message. 
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5 Traditional methods to address repudiation within a digital 
environment 
To enable this legally binding and enforceable “contract” between the 
buyer and the seller in a digital environment, traditional B2C and B2B 
systems require that the prospective buyer (customer) provides credit 
card information, which is immediately, electronically verified with the 
bank, before transactions entered into via the Internet will be accepted 
by the seller (supplier). This serves as primary internal control measure 
to ensure that no orders are accepted and processed by the supplier, 
before payment for the items could be confirmed.  
Within such a system other additional risks, as the provision of stolen 
credit card information, the intercepting of credit card information, etc., 
exist which will not be addressed in this report.  
According to Williams the following aspects are considered when the 







• Record, and 
• Registered. 
In an attempt to determine the validity of a digital contract the 
abovementioned has to be modified. The following aspects will be 
considered when a court examines a contract in digital form: (Garcia-
Tobar, 2001 and Williams, 2001) 
• Authentication that the content of the digital contract is complete 
and unaltered. Can it be truly verified as the original that the two 
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parties agreed to? Is there proof that the digital communication 
involved in the business transaction actually came from the parties 
that they purport to come?  
• Signature: Did the parties involved actually intend to sign the 
contract and did parties who had the necessary authority within the 
respective organisations to do so in fact sign the contract? Does 
the system for the exchange and signing of digital contracts enable 
each recipient to determine who really sent the message, and 
whether that individual is in fact who he/she claims to be? 
• Writing: both parties signed identical versions of the contract. The 
contract exists in a standard digital form. Each of the parties, when 
signing the contract, has submitted their signatures to the other 
party and was sure of delivery. Does proof exists of the content of 
the transaction, namely the communications that actually occurred 
between the parties during the contract formation process?  
• Validity: Applicable information, if need be, and so agreed to by the 
parties, are kept confidential and disclosure of the transaction to 
unauthorised persons are prevented. 
• Operational: The contract was properly time-stamped and it can be 
verified that the individuals that digitally signed the contract had the 
authority to sign it at the time they did. 
• Record: Both parties can keep a copy of the contract in a tamper-
proof and secure manner. Sufficient measures were taken to 
reduce the possibility of deliberate or inadvertent alteration of the 
contents of the electronic record of the transaction.  
• Registration: If required, the digital contract was recorded at a 
digital notary service, without indicating where the supplier was 
located. 
It is important to take note from the above that authentication, signing by 
an authorised part, as well as ensuring the unchanged content of a 
message (which also contributes to ensuring non-repudiation as 
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illustrated earlier) are aspects needed to make digital contracts (of which 
a B2B sales order is one) valid. A valid digital order will thus contribute to 
prevent repudiation thereof.  
 
6 Open B2B account systems  
In addition to the traditional methods of settling e-commerce transactions 
(by way of credit card payments and verification), “open” B2B accounts 
emerged. In such systems payment for the transaction does not take 
place immediately as discussed earlier. In open account systems the 
purchase is placed on account, to be settled by the customer at a future 
time, as agreed upon by the two parties – usually at the end of the 
month by way of an electronic fund transfer (EFT).  
The fact that immediate payment for the goods is not ensured, creates 
an even greater risk for the supplier, namely that payment would never 
be received - “… while a credit card maximum cap … protects 
consumers engaging in e-commerce, there are no such guarantees in 
place for B2B e-commerce” (Garcia-Tobar, 2001). It is therefore even 
more important to ensure the validity of the digital B2B open account 
system order before it is accepted and executed.   
In 2001 (Morphy, 2001) Amazon wooed its customers with a new credit 
option - “Amazon Credit Accounts”, which gave consumers the option to 
pay for their purchases at a later stage, was introduced. Bill Johnson, 
president of Citi Commerce Solutions, predicted that this new credit 
option will “create an even better experience” for Amazon.com 
customers. (Morphy, 2001)  
Amazon joined the B2B market by introducing their new “Amazon 
Corporate Accounts” in 2001. When Amazon first broached the subject 
of a B2B store, the company said that it anticipated this new sales 
program to bring in US$150 million over the next two years. Just after 
launching this initiative Amazon reported that hundreds of organisations, 
including university libraries, Oracle and 3Com have already signed up 
for Amazon corporate accounts. (Enos, 2001) This serves to illustrate 
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the magnitude of the B2B open account e-commerce system.    
A prerequisite for such an open account system is the existence of a 
relationship of trust between the two business partners. To open such an 
account, a credit application has to be completed and a series of 
questions be answered to verify the identity of the applicant. If approved, 
an account number is provided online. To place an order on account, the 
assigned Amazon credit account number has to be entered as the 
method of payment on the digital order form. The customer will be billed 
monthly for all credit purchases made during the preceding period. 
Customers have the option to pay the entire bill each month or elect to 
carry a balance on their account. (Amazon.com) Failure to pay the entire 
bill when it becomes due, will however, lead to interest being charged at 
high interest rates (Morphy, 2001). Corporate account holders are able 
to assign account managers and authorised purchasers for their 
corporate accounts. Account managers will have access to online order 
history for all account purchases and have the option of receiving notices 
via e-mail every time a purchase is made (Enos, 2001). 
It is thus clear that in a B2B open account system it is essential that 
internal controls be implemented to specifically:  
• Identify and authenticate each other when entering into 
transactions, especially before accepting and processing these 
transactions, as well as 
• To ensure the processing integrity of these transactions. It must be 
ensured that, after the initial authorisation of a transaction, no 
unauthorised changes are made to the content of the transaction. 
This will greatly reduce the possibility of a B2B open account order being 






CONTROL OBJECTIVES WITHIN EXISTING CONTROL 
FRAMEWORKS THAT ADDRESS REPUDIATION 
 
1 Need for control models specifically for IT 
While overall business models, like COSO and CoCo (as mentioned 
earlier) existed, more focussed control models for Information 
Technology (IT) was necessary. Due to the fact that the available control 
models was firstly and foremostly frameworks of internal control for 
management, more detail control objectives that focussed on the need 
and business objectives for IT specifically, did not exist. With this as aim, 
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) developed “The 
Information Technology Control Guidelines”.  
The Information Technology Control Guidelines defines broad control 
objectives that is necessary within each area of IT governance (as 
defined in Chapter 3). It goes further by defining the minimum control 
standards, including criteria, necessary to meet each defined control 
objective. Examples of alternative control techniques, or internal control 
measures, that can be implemented to achieve each of the minimum 
control standards as defined, are also provided in the Guidelines.  
These Information Technology Control Guidelines of CICA evolved and 
was refined further over the past number of years, as discussed in the 
following section, to arrive at the two existing control models for IT in 
particular, namely: 
• The Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 
(COBIT), and 




2 Existing control models for IT 
2.1 The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology 
(COBIT) 
In an attempt to define clear policies and good practices for security and 
IT control in particular, the “Control Objectives for Information and 
related Technology” (COBIT) was developed by The Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), in 1996 (Weber, 1999: 
985). With this the ISACA attempted to be bridge the gaps between 
business risks, control needs and technical aspects in an IT-environment 
(COBIT, 2000: 5). Another aim was to bridge the gap between the 
management models (as COSO) and the more focused control models 
for IT that existed at this stage (like The Information Technology Control 
Guidelines of CICA). COBIT aims to be more comprehensive for 
management and to operate at a higher level than technology standards 
for information systems management. “Thus, COBIT is the model for IT 
governance!” (COBIT, 2000: 13). COBIT provides guidance on IT 
governance by providing the structure that links IT processes, IT 
resources and information to enterprise strategies and objectives 
(Hunton, et al., 2004: 3). 
According to Romney and Steinbart COBIT is a framework of generally 
applicable information systems security and control practices for IT 
control, which focuses on business processes (Romney & Steinbart, 
2003: 197 and Weber, 1999: 985). This framework allows: 
• Management to benchmark the security and control practices of IT 
environments, 
• Users of IT services to be assured that adequate security and 
control exists, and 
• Auditors to substantiate their opinions on internal control and to 
advise on IT security and control matters. (Romney & Steinbart, 
2003: 197) 
In 2000, the COBIT Steering Committee and IT Governance Institute of 
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ISACA released the third edition of COBIT. It is this edition of COBIT that 
is used extensively in this report. According to COBIT 3rd edition, 
adequate control measures need to be defined, implemented and 
monitored over the IT resources of an organisation (data, application 
systems, technology, facilities and people) in order to ensure that the 
business requirements for information (quality-, fiduciary- and security 
requirements) is met. COBIT breaks down these three requirements into 
seven distinct categories of information characteristics, namely 
effectiveness, efficiency, confidentiality, integrity, availability, compliance 
and reliability. (COBIT, 2000: 13-15)  
IT managers must achieve these characteristics while balancing the use 
of their IT resources and it is here where the COBIT Guidelines come in. 
COBIT designed a framework of IT control objectives for four broad 
domains, namely organisation and planning, acquisition and 
implementation, delivery and support and monitoring to assist the 
managers in this process.  
An IT control objective is defined as “a statement of the desired result or 
purpose to be achieved by implementing control procedures in a 
particular IT activity” (COBIT, 2000: 12). In order to achieve these IT 
control objectives, COBIT set out high level control objectives which is 
then broken up into various specific, detailed control objectives to be 
achieved.   
 
2.2 TrustServices 
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) and CICA are 
of the opinion, that to be properly effective, the Internet requires a solid 
foundation of technology, procedures, policies and standards. They 
acknowledge that human involvement is necessary in the design and 
implementation thereof. To assist these people in their task the two 
organisations have, in conjunction, developed and introduced standards 
to address assurance regarding system reliability and e-commerce 
activities in particular (AICPA, 2001). These standards consisted of 
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“Principles and Criteria” and were specifically applicable to two 
AICPA/CICA services, namely SysTrust (for any defined electronic 
system) and WebTrust (which specifically addressed electronic 
commerce).  
AICPA and CICA have since began harmonising the underlying 
“Principles and Criteria” by developing the “Trust Services Principles and 
Criteria”. It is currently issued in draft form under a common banner of 
“Trust Services”. The two bodies do not intend to change SysTrust or 
WebTrust services, or to introduce additional branded services at this 
stage. Both SysTrust and WebTrust products and services remain 
unchanged at this point in time as assurance and advisory services.   
The effective date for the application of the Trust Services Principles and 
Criteria is for appointments commencing on/after 1 April 2003 (AICPA, 
2003). Due to the fact that the TrustServices Principles and Criteria 
supersedes the existing SysTrust Principles and Criteria version 2.0 and 
version 3.0 of the WebTrust Principles and Criteria, it will be used in this 
study. 
TrustServices specifically focuses on internal control and, after being 
submitted to an examination, an opinion is expressed indicating whether 
a specific website met the requirements of the “TrustServices Principles 
and Criteria”. This certification is displayed on the website concerned 
and certifies that the website maintains the necessary controls in 5 
areas, namely: 
• Online Privacy, 
• Security, 
• Confidentiality, 
• Availability, and  
• Processing Integrity.  
With this process the experience and reputation of respected e-
commerce experts and advisors worldwide can be utilised to assist the 
supplier in identifying business risks, as well as making 
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recommendations for the necessary controls that could be implemented 
to address the risks identified. For consumers and visitors to a website 
which bears the certificate concerned, this independent seal means 
reliability, which also contributes to attracting and keeping good 
customers. A licensed Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chartered 
Accountant (CA), or other equivalent provides this certificate after 
performing the examination required. The websites are periodically 
reviewed to ensure compliance with the latest principles. 
 
3 Control objectives and principles from existing control models 
that address repudiation 
As mentioned previously, both COBIT and AICPA and CICA’s 
TrustServices defines control objectives and/or principles applicable to 
IT systems and e-commerce systems in particular. The control 
objectives and/or principles from each of the respective models that 
address repudiation are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
  
3.1 Control objectives from COBIT 
One of the control objectives formulated by COBIT is to “Ensure 
Systems Security” (DS5) (COBIT, 2000: 101). This is defined as “Control 
over the IT process of ensuring systems security that satisfies the 
business requirement to safeguard information against unauthorised 
use, disclosure or modification, damage or loss, and is enabled by 
logical access controls which ensure that access to systems, data and 
programmes is restricted to authorised users and takes into 
consideration … authorisation, authentication and access control, user 
identification and authorisation profiles …” (COBIT, 2000: 100). It should 
be clear from this definition that ensuring system security will contribute 
towards ensuring non-repudiation of transactions. 
The following detailed control objectives which assist to “Ensure 
Systems Security”, is regarded as applicable to address the particular 
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risks as illustrated in this report: (COBIT, 2000) 
• Identification, Authentication and Access (DS5 – 5.2), 
• Transaction Authorisation (DS5 – 5.14), 
• Non-Repudiation (DS5 – 5.15), and  
• Trusted Path (DS5 – 5.16).  
These detailed control objectives and their contribution to address the 
topic of this report is discussed below. 
  
3.1.1 Identification, Authentication and Access 
COBIT’s detailed control objective Identification, Authentication and 
Access is defined as follows:  
“The logical access to and use of IT computing resources should be 
restricted by the implementation of adequate identification, 
authentication and authorisation mechanisms, linking users and 
resources with access rules. Such mechanisms should prevent 
unauthorised personnel, dial-up connections and other system (network) 
entry ports from accessing computer resources and minimise the need 
for authorised users to use multiple sign-ons. Procedures should also be 
in place to keep authentication and access mechanisms effective” 
(COBIT, 2000: 101).  
This control objective thus necessitates the implementation and 
maintenance of appropriate identification-, authentication- and 
authorisation mechanisms, including clear access rules, in order to limit 
access to the system, the data and other IT resources. If implemented, 
this will contribute to prevent unauthorised persons for gaining access to 
a supplier’s system to place unauthorised orders on the accounts of valid 
B2B open account system customers. It will also prevent unauthorised 




3.1.2 Transaction Authorisation 
To achieve the detailed control objective Transaction Authorisation, the 
“Organisational policy should ensure that, where appropriate, controls 
are implemented to provide authenticity of transactions and establish the 
validity of a user’s claimed identity to the system” (COBIT, 2000: 102). 
This entails that, in an attempt to properly authorise a transaction, it is 
critical to authenticate the transaction as well as the identity of a 
potential customer. This will contribute to prevent unauthorised persons 
from entering into unauthorised transactions on the open accounts of 
valid B2B customers.  
 
3.1.3 Non-repudiation 
According to COBIT, an organisation policy that ensures that, where 
appropriate, neither party can deny transactions, as well as controls 
implemented to provide non-repudiation of origin or receipt, proof of 
submission, and receipt of transactions, are essential fundamentals to 
provide non-repudiation services. (COBIT, 2000: 103)  
COBIT thus specifically requires that to ensure system security the 
necessary internal control measures should be implemented to ensure 
non-repudiation.  
 
3.1.4 Trusted Path 
A Trusted Path must exist and be maintained between the two parties to 
a transaction. According to COBIT “organisational policy should ensure 
that sensitive transaction data is only exchanged over a trusted path. 
Sensitive information includes security management information, 
sensitive transaction data, passwords and cryptographic keys” (COBIT, 
2000: 103). It would contribute to reduce the possibility of messages 
being intercepted and/or unauthorised changes being made to it during 
transmission, resulting in customers repudiating order transactions. 
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3.2 Principles from Trust Services 
The two TrustServices’ principles that relates to the risks addressed in 
this report, are: 
• Security, and  
• Processing Integrity.  
 
3.2.1 Security 
According to TrustServices, the Security-principle refers to “the 
protection of the system components from unauthorised access, both 
physical and logical. In e-commerce … systems, the respective parties 
wish to ensure that information provided is available only to those 
individuals who need access to complete the transaction … Limiting 
access to the system components helps prevent potential abuse of 
system components, … improper access to, (and) use (of) …” (AICPA, 
2003: 5). The risks that form the purpose of this study are therefore 
partly addressed under this principle.  
Under this principle, specific criteria that will assist in achieving this 
objective, is described. Applicable criteria under Security that will 
address repudiation, is: (AICPA, 2003) 
“3.1 Procedures exist to restrict logical access to the defined system, 
including, but not limited to, the following matters: 
b. Identification and authentication of users. 
… 
d. The process to grant system access privileges and 
permissions. 
3.3 Procedures exist to protect against unauthorised logical access to 
the defined system. 
… 
3.5 Encryption or other equivalent security techniques are used to 
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protect user authentication information and the corresponding 
session transmitted over the Internet or other public networks.” 
(AICPA, 2003) 
 
3.2.2 Processing Integrity 
Processing Integrity is defined in TrustServices as follows: “The 
processing integrity principle refers to the completeness, accuracy and 
timeliness, and authorisation of system processing. Processing integrity 
exists if a system performs its intended function in an unimpaired 
manner, free from unauthorised or inadvertent manipulation” (AICPA, 
2003: 25).  
It is under the “authorisation”-part of the Processing Integrity-principle 
that the risk of unauthorised changes to previously authorised 
transactions is addressed. Authorisation includes assurances that 
processing is performed in accordance with the required approvals and 
privileges defined by policies governing system processing (AICPA, 
2003). It is important to note that “If a system processes information 
inputs from sources outside of the system’s boundaries, an entity can 
establish only limited controls over the … authorisation … of the 
information submitted for processing” (AICPA), as is the case with order 
transactions (input) handled by e-commerce systems where data is 
directly entered via Web-enabled input screens or forms by the users.  
Specific criteria within Trust Services under the Processing Integrity-
principle that addresses the risk of unauthorised changes in particular, 
is:  (AICPA, 2003) 
“3.1 The procedures related to … authorisation of inputs are consistent 
with the documented system processing integrity policies. 
If the system is an e-commerce system, the entity’s procedures 
include, but may not be limited to, the following matters: 
… 
• Positive acknowledgement is received from the customer 
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before the transaction is processed. 
… 
3.4 There are procedures to enable tracing of information inputs from 
their source to their final disposition and vice versa. 
3.5 Procedures exist to restrict logical access to the defined system 
including, but not limited to, the following matters: 
b. Identification and authentication of users. 
… 
d. The process to grant system access privileges and 
permissions. 
… 
3.7 Procedures exist to protect against unauthorised logical access to 
the defined system. 
3.9 Encryption or other equivalent security techniques are used to 
protect user authentication information and the corresponding 






INTERNAL CONTROL MEASURES FOR NON-
REPUDIATION 
 
1 Internal control measures recommended by existing control 
models  
In the preceding chapter it was shown that both COBIT and the 
TrustServices Principles and Criteria have defined particular objectives 
or principles that address the risks that form the basis of this report. It 
was also mentioned that both institutions provides examples of 
recommended internal control measures that can be implemented to 
address the objectives as defined. In this chapter these internal control 
measured are identified.  
 
2 Recommendations by COBIT 
According to COBIT, procedures such as regular changes to passwords 
should be in place to keep authentication and access control 
mechanisms effective. This will among others ensure proper 
Identification, Authentication and Access as defined (COBIT, 2000: 101). 
Transaction authorisation requires the use of cryptographic techniques 
for signing and verifying transactions, to determine the authenticity of a 
transaction and the validity of the user’s claimed identity (COBIT, 2000: 
102).  
Techniques which can be implemented to achieve the control objective 
Non-Repudiation includes the use of digital signatures, time stamping 
and trusted third parties, with appropriate policies that take into account 
relevant regulatory requirements (COBIT, 2000: 103).  
To establish a Trusted Path it may, according to COBIT, necessitate the 
use of encryption between users, between users and systems, and 
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between systems (COBIT, 2000: 103).   
 
3 Recommendations by TrustServices 
3.1 Security 
The following internal control measures, that are included in the 
TrustServices Principles and Criteria’s Security-principle, can be utilised 
to address the risks identified in this report: (AICPA, 2003)  
• Unique user ID’s are assigned to individual users. Users are 
required to log on to the entity’s network and application systems 
with their user ID’s and password before access is granted. Sound 
password control include passwords to contain at least six 
characters, one of which is non-alphanumeric, passwords being 
case sensitive and passwords to be updated every 90 days.  
• All paths that allow access to significant information resources 
(access paths) are controlled by the access control system and 
operating system facilities. Access requires users to provide their 
user ID and password. Privileges are granted to authenticated 
users based on their user profiles. 
• The ability to create or modify users and user access privileges is 
limited to the security administration team alone. 
• The login session is terminated after three unsuccessful login 
attempts. Terminated login sessions are logged for follow-up by the 
security administrator. 
• Virtual private networking (VPN) software is used to permit remote 
access by authorised users. The VPN server through specific 
“client” software, as well as user ID and passwords authenticates 
users.  
A virtual private network is a network that controls access to an 
extranet by encryption and authentication technology. With this 
technique the functionality of a privately owned network is provided, 
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whilst the Internet, a worldwide network, is being used (Romney & 
Steinbart, 2003: 66).   
• Unneeded network services are deactivated on the entity’s servers. 
• Firewalls are used and configured to prevent unauthorised access. 
Firewall events are logged and reviewed daily by the security 
administrator.   
A firewall consists of a “combination of security algorithms and 
router communication protocols that prevent outsiders from tapping 
into corporate databases and e-mail systems.” This technique 
prevents unauthorised access by both outside parties, as well as 
employees, who attempt to gain access to parts of the system they 
should not have access. It provides “a barrier between the 
networks that prevents unwanted information from flowing into and 
out of the trusted network (Romney & Steinbart, 2003: 245).  
• Intrusion detection systems provide continuous monitoring of the 
entity’s network and early identification of potential security 
breaches.  
• The organisation contracts with third parties to conduct periodic 
security reviews and vulnerability assessments. Results and 
recommendations for improvement are reported to management. 
• The organisation uses 128-bit secure sockets layer (SSL) 
encryption for transmission of … information over public networks, 
including user ID’s and passwords. 
• Account activity, subsequent to successful login, is encrypted 
through a 128-bit secure sockets layer (SSL) session. 
• Users are logged out on request, or after 10 minutes of inactivity. 
 
3.2 Processing Integrity 
According to the TrustServices Principles and Criteria, the following 
controls under Processing Integrity will, additionally to those mentioned 
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in the preceding section, prevent unauthorised access to, and changes 
to information during transmission (AICPA, 2003):  
• Logical access controls such as user identification and 
authentication systems, passwords, physical possession or 
biometric identification, etc.  
• Customer account manager performs regular reviews of customer 
complaints, back-order logs, and other transactional analysis. This 
information is compared to customer service agreements.  
• During transmission information is protecting using a variety of 
methods including: 
- Encryption of transmission information.  
- Batch header and control total reconciliations. 
- Message authentication codes and hash totals. 
- Private leased lines or virtual private networking connections 
with authorised users. 
- Bonded couriers and tamper-resistant packaging. 
• The entity e-mails an order confirmation to the customer-supplied 
e-mail address. The order confirmation contains, among others, 
order details as well as shipping and delivery information. Returned 
e-mails are investigated by customer service. 
• Input transactions are date and time stamped by the system and 
identified with the submitting source (user, terminal, IP address). 
• Each order has a unique identifier that can be used to access the 
order and related shipment and payment settlement information. 
 
4 Additional control measure that will address the repudiation 
risk 
Additionally to the controls as recommended by COBIT and 
TrustServices, there are other important aspects to consider when 
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receiving orders placed on open accounts in B2B systems. Garcia-Tobar 
divides these controls into two basic categories, namely: 
• Operational procedures, and 
• Technology choices or concerns (Garcia-Tobar, 2001).  
 
4.1 Operational procedures  
• Companies should retain and hire personnel that are familiar with 
security operation procedures and have personal knowledge of 
how a system can operate securely, and how it actually operated 
during creation or storage of a record. Alternatively, they should 
outsource this function to a dedicated provider of trust and security 
systems. 
• Trust provider systems (software components specifically geared 
towards providing trust and security requirements) should be 
supported (or purchased) from vendors that support trusted 
software engineering processes that leave a trail of design 
decisions for each stage in the manufacturing process. The trail 
support proves the reliability of a records system, which in turn 
supports the claim of integrity, authenticity, and admissibility of a 
record as evidence. The functions and systems of trust provider’s 
system should be documented in a formal “security target” 
documentation format. 
• E-business applications specifically targeted at trust and security 
should be subjected to periodic security audits according to criteria 
laid down either by the state licensing authorities or by mutual 
consent of the parties. These checks should measure the 
effectiveness of the management, operational and technical 
controls of all trustworthy systems.   
• Companies must validate the identification credentials presented to 
them. Without validation fraudulently obtained or revoked digital 
certificates can be used to access confidential information or 
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infiltrate the heart of a business. 
• Organisations must have a secure, fast and reliable way to send 
sensitive data over Internet. 
• Companies must be able to securely generate, exchange, archive 
and reconstruct e-transactions in an auditable manner. 
• Electronic contracts and transactions must be made legally binding 
by providing all essential elements of non-repudiation. 
• Digital receipts, that offer proof that an e-transaction occurred at a 
specific time and date must be used. (Garcia-Tobar, 2001) 
 
4.2 Technology choices 
• Use digital signature technology and certificate authorities. 
Fundamentally, electronic commerce involves the use of remote 
communications and therefore necessitates all parties involved to 
authenticate one another. One of the primary technologies 
proposed for authentication is digital signature technology.  
A further claimed advantage of digital signature technology 
concerns the issue of ‘non-repudiation’ claimed by the relying party 
against the ‘alleged’ signer of an electronic document (McCullagh & 
Caelli, 2000).  
Certificate authority (CA) can be chosen by determining the use of 
digital signatures for authenticating the identity of individuals 
involved in business transactions. Validation can be achieved by 
building a set of e-business applications in such a way that all 
digital certificate transactions and digital signatures are validated in 
real-time prior to acceptance (Garcia-Tobar, 2001). 
A digital signature is an electronic message that uniquely identifies 
the sender of the message, similarly to the way in which a 
handwritten signature uniquely identifies the person signing a paper 
document. It is achieved through public key infrastructure (PKI), a 
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method of encryption using two sets of keys. The own key, the 
“public key” is publicly available, whilst the second key, the “private 
key”, is kept secret and is only known to the owner of the two 
particular keys. Any one of the two keys (“public” or “private”) can 
be used to encrypt a message, whilst only the other key of the 
particular “public-private”-pair can be used to decode the message. 
A digital certificate identities the owner of a particular “private key” 
and the corresponding “public key”, as well as the time during 
which the certificate is valid. These digital certificates are issued by 
reliable third parties, known as “certificate authorities”. Verisign, 
Entrust and Digital Signature Trust are examples of well-known 
certificate authorities. (Romney & Steinbart, 2003: 62) 
• Secure delivery and receipt transactions, authenticated using 
trusted infrastructure services must be properly ‘received’. The 
recipient should formally acknowledge error-free delivery of data 
and also formally accept responsibility for handling of the 
transaction.   
• All business applications should be acknowledged with a 
tamperproof digital receipt that can be stored in a long-term, secure 
and tamper-proof way.  
• Enterprises should retain records of transactions and contracts, 
along with digital certificates for pre-specified records and 





MATRIX OF NON-REPUDIATION OBJECTIVES AND 
APPROPRIATE INTERNAL CONTROL MEASURES 
 
Taking into account the information as set out in the previous chapters, 
the following are the most important objectives to ensure non-repudiation 
of a specific B2B order transactions within an open account system:   
• Identification of the prospective customer/user. 
• Authentication of the user before entering into a transaction. 
• An identified and authenticated user is only granted access to the 
system according to the pre-defined authorisation rules – this 
implies limiting access, whilst ensuring that adequate division of 
duties is enforced as well. 
• All attempts to gain unauthorised access or to make unauthorised 
changes are identified, logged and followed-up – adequate 
monitoring. 
• The integrity of a transaction transmitted over the communication 
channel is guaranteed to ensure that no unauthorised changes are 
made to previously authorised transactions.    
As set out in Chapter 6, there are various techniques or internal control 
measures that can be implemented to achieve the above-mentioned 
objectives or to address the risks as defined for a supplier receiving an 
order in a B2B open account system. 
The objectives as defined above, as well as the main categories of 
internal control measures (as per Chapter 6) that can be implemented to 




TECHNIQUES Identification Authentication Limiting 
Access 
Monitoring Integrity 
• Competent, reliable employees are in control of 
system security, or this services is outsourced to a 






• User profiles are defined 
• Users log on using unique user ID’s and passwords 
• Adequate control over passwords 
• Access is only granted to authenticated users 
according to the defined user profiles  
• All access routes to the system are controlled, using 
access control systems and/or operating systems  
• Users are logged-out on request, or after 10 minutes 
of non-activity on the system 
• Control over the creation and amendment of 
passwords and user profiles 
• Log-on sessions are terminated after 3 unsuccessful 













































TECHNIQUES Identification Authentication Limiting 
Access 
Monitoring Integrity 
• Unsuccessful attempts to gain access are recorded 
and followed-up 
X 
• Cryptographic techniques are used to sign and verify 
transactions 
• All parties involved identify and authenticate one 
another before access is granted – by for example 
making use of digital signature technology with PKI   
• Trusted third party certificate authorities, for example 
Verisign, Entrust and Digital Signature Trust, are 
used   
• Provide input transactions with date- and time 
stamping which can be verified by the source (user, 
terminal, IP address) 
• Digital acknowledgements of receipt, with the specific 






































• Computer activity and messages (including userID's 
and passwords) transmitted between users, between 




TECHNIQUES Identification Authentication Limiting 
Access 
Monitoring Integrity 
users and systems, as well as between systems, are 
protected by using among others:  
- Encryption of information, using a 128-bit 
secure sockets layer (SSL) session 
- Batch header and control total reconciliations 
- Message authentication codes and hash totals 
- Privately leased lines, or virtual private 
networks with authorised users 
- Bonded couriers and tamper-resistant 
packaging 
X 
• Virtual private network (VPN) software is used to 
authenticate outside users and control their access to 
the system 
 
X   X 
• Firewalls are configured to control all access to the 
system 















TECHNIQUES Identification Authentication Limiting 
Access 
Monitoring Integrity 
• All possible security breaches are followed up X 
• Intrusion detection systems are used to monitor the 
system continuously 
• All possible security breaches are followed up 




• Independent third parties perform periodic reviews of 
system security and control. Results and 
recommendations are reported to management 
directly 
• E-business security software are subjected to 
periodic security audits, that evaluates management-, 






























SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The statement of the problem to be addressed in this report as well as 
the purpose of this study, the methodology applied, as well as the 
limitations of the study was provided in Chapter 1.     
The concept of business risk, the purpose of internal control and various 
control frameworks for internal control was defined and illustrated in 
Chapter 2. It was mentioned that business risks are created as 
transactions take place between business partners. These risks differ 
within each industry as well as within each business cycle. Various 
internal control measures can be implemented to address business risks 
associated with transactions. To design an adequate system of internal 
control, risk management has to be applied.  
A sales transaction taking place between two business partners was 
chosen to form the topic for further study in this report. It was illustrated 
that one of the most important risks a supplier faces when selling 
physical items to a customer is the risk of repudiation of the transaction 
by the customer. This leads to the supplier suffering financial losses. 
The reasons for repudiation was investigated and in Chapter 3 it was 
found to be the result of one of two possible situations, namely: 
• Unauthorised orders placed on behalf of an existing customer, 
and/or 
• Subsequent unauthorised changes made to previously authorised 
order transactions.  
To ensure non-repudiation a supplier therefore needs to implement the 
necessary internal control measures to address the particular risk. The 
relevant controls that can be implemented by a supplier to address 
repudiation within a manual system were mentioned in Chapter 3. 
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The sales transaction process was “translated” to a computer 
environment and it was illustrated in Chapter 3 that the principles of risk 
and internal control measures are still applicable when a supplier 
operates within a computerised environment. The importance of IT –
governance, namely to ensure that the necessary internal control 
measures are implemented within an IT environment, was mentioned. 
Examples of the internal control measures that could be implemented by 
a supplier to ensure non-repudiation within a computerised environment 
was provided in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 4 the Internet, e-business, e-commerce, B2B commerce and 
open B2B account systems was defined. The significance of B2B 
transactions, which forms the topic of this report, was illustrated.  
E-business risk and the fundamental problems that arise when 
conducting e-business transactions were mentioned. The objectives of 
ensuring non-repudiation in a digital environment were illustrated. The 
traditional methods to enable a legally binding and enforceable contract 
between a supplier and customer were illustrated. 
The problems and risks that a supplier, who provide for customers 
buying on open B2B accounts, faces were illustrated in Chapter 4. It was 
deducted that a prerequisite for such an open account system is the 
existence of a relationship of trust between the two business partners. 
The B2B business partners need to ensure that the necessary internal 
control measures are implemented to specifically:  
• Identify and authenticate each other when entering into 
transactions, especially before accepting and processing 
transactions, as well as 
• To ensure the processing integrity of these transactions. It must be 
ensured that, after the initial authorisation of a transaction, no 
unauthorised changes are made to the content of the transaction. 
Chapter 8 
 57
In Chapter 5 the two existing control models for IT were identified. They 
are: 
• The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology 
(COBIT) of ISACA, and 
• The TrustServices Principles and Criteria, a joint initiative of AICPA 
and CICA.    
It was found that the following detailed control objectives as defined by 
COBIT will assist to Ensure Systems Security and was regarded as 
applicable to address the particular risks as illustrated in this report: 
• Identification, Authentication and Access,  
• Transaction Authorisation, 
• Non-Repudiation, and  
• Trusted Path.  
The two TrustServices’ principles that relates to the risks addressed in 
this report, are: 
• Security, and  
• Processing Integrity.  
The internal control measures recommended by COBIT and 
TrustServices to assist in providing non-repudiation services was 
identified and listed in Chapter 6. Additionally to these, it was found that 
there are operational procedures, as well as technology choices that 
would contribute in ensuring non-repudiation for B2B open account 
system suppliers. These were also briefly mentioned in Chapter 6. 
Based on the study performed the most important objectives to prevent 
the repudiation of a specific B2B order transaction within an open 
account system were formulated. They are:   
• Identification of the prospective customer/user, 
• Authentication of the user before entering into a transaction, 
• An identified and authenticated user is only granted access to the 
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system according to the pre-defined authorisation rules – this 
implies limiting access whilst ensuring that adequate segregation of 
duties is enforced as well, 
• All attempts to gain unauthorised access or to make unauthorised 
changes is identified, logged and followed-up – adequate 
monitoring, and 
• The integrity of a transaction transmitted over the communication 
channel is ensured – no unauthorised changes are made to 
previously authorised transactions.    
In Chapter 7 the way in which the internal control measures identified in 
Chapter 6 would ensure that each of the objectives defined above could 
be achieved, were illustrated by way of a matrix.  
The purpose of this study as defined in Chapter 1, namely a framework 
of internal control measures that can be implemented by B2B suppliers 
to address the risk of repudiation when orders are placed on open 
accounts are received, was thus achieved.  
If the control measures contained in the framework are implemented by 
the B2B suppliers concerned it would lead to an improved system of 
internal control. It will decrease the occurrence of repudiation due to 
invalid orders that were accepted and processed, or processed whilst 
containing unauthorised changes. These controls should thus lead to the 
prevention or reduction of losses suffered by B2B suppliers as a result of 
repudiation.   
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